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Abstract—A key component of a smart grid is its ability to collect useful information from a power grid for enabling control centers to
estimate the current states of the power grid. Such information can be delivered to the control centers via wireless or wired networks. It
is envisioned that wireless technology will be widely used for local-area communication subsystems in the smart grid (e.g., in
distribution networks). However, various attacks with serious impact can be launched in wireless networks such as channel jamming
attacks and denial-of-service attacks. In particular, jamming attacks can cause significant damages to power grids, e.g., delayed
delivery of time-critical messages can prevent control centers from properly controlling the outputs of generators to match load
demands. In this paper, a communication subsystem with enhanced self-healing capability in the presence of jamming is designed via
intelligent local controller switching while integrating a retransmission mechanism. The proposed framework allows sufficient readings
from smart meters to be continuously collected by various local controllers to estimate the states of a power grid under various attack
scenarios. The jamming probability is also analyzed considering the impact of jammer power and shadowing effects. In addition,
guidelines on optimal placement of local controllers to ensure effective switching of smart meters under jamming are provided. Via
theoretical, experimental and simulation studies, it is demonstrated that our proposed system is effective in maintaining
communications between smart meters and local controllers even when multiple jammers are present in the network.
Index Terms—Smart Grid, Local controller switching, Jamming.
✦
1 INTRODUCTION
SMART grid is proposed to improve the efficiency and reliabil-ity of existing power grids by adding automated monitoring,
communication, self-diagnosis, and demand-response capabilities.
Technically, the smart grid [1] can be divided into smart infrastruc-
ture, smart management, and smart protection systems. The smart
infrastructure which supports bidirectional flow of electricity and
information is further subdivided into smart energy, information,
and communication subsystems [1]. The smart energy subsystem
takes care of advanced electricity generation and delivery, whereas
the smart information subsystem involves advanced metering,
monitoring and management. The smart communication subsys-
tem facilitates information exchanges among systems, devices,
and applications.
We focus on the smart communication subsystem that is
used to support the smart information subsystem for distribution
networks. Wireless technology is promising for this application
as it is relatively easy to install, and also supports high-rate data
transmissions, e.g., up to 100 Mbps in a range of 50 km with the
IEEE 802.16 protocol [2]. Hence it is expected that the last mile of
the communication subsystem, e.g., the communication between
smart meters and controllers, will often be wireless in nature. Such
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a highly distributed wireless system in the smart grid makes it
more vulnerable to various adversary attacks [3], [4]. In particular,
jamming attacks aim to disrupt the data communication between
smart meters and local controllers, which is considered as an
important first step in an adversary’s attempt to launch a variety of
attacks. For instance, an adversary can delay or block smart meter
reading collection and jam real-time price signals transmitted in
the last mile to undermine the demand-respond system [5]. Even
small-scale jamming attacks in local area networks can cause
partial unavailability of data samples for state estimation [6], [7].
Furthermore, an attacker can launch a malicious jamming attack
which prevents a substation from collecting complete data, and
also simultaneously launch a false data injection attack to provide
fabricated data to the substation. Such combined attacks can cause
the substation to use the corrupted information for state estimation
and result in producing the wrong control actions, causing dire
consequences on the smart grid operations.
Compared to the legacy power systems, the smart grid operates
in a more open communication network covering large geograph-
ical areas. Due to the critical importance of power infrastructures,
resilience operation in communication networks is essential to
sustain network availability. Given the large geographical coverage
of the smart grid, eliminating jammers manually by dispatching
technicians is resource consuming and less practical. The smart
grid needs to have enhanced self-healing capability to maintain
normal network operations in the presence of attacks. Thus, coping
with jamming serves as the first line of defense to achieve reliable,
secure, and real-time data delivery and customer management
in the smart grid. Adopting traditional channel hopping tech-
niques [8], [9] in smart meters and local controllers is useful in
alleviating jamming effects. However, smart attackers may adjust
their jamming strategies based on the observations they gather
from the on-going communications between smart meters and
controllers. For example, a jammer with fast hopping speed can
quickly identify the channel in use between smart meters and a
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local controller, making the employment of pure channel hopping
less effective. Therefore, more intelligent defense strategies need
to be devised.
Our basic idea is to exploit all the available channels between
smart meters and controllers that can be used to communicate
and maintain high data delivery rate under jamming. In this
paper, we propose a framework that enables smart meters to
identify nearby local controllers in addition to its primary local
controller. It allows smart meters and local controllers to de-
termine appropriate channels to communicate with one another
when jamming is present. Our framework provides enhanced
flexibility, which allows smart meters to communicate with any
nearby controllers that they can hear on any available channel, and
hence increases the successful data delivery rate in the distribution
network under jamming attacks. Through theoretical analysis,
experimental study and simulation evaluation, we show that our
framework is effective in allowing smart meters and controllers to
continue their communications even under malicious attacks when
multiple and colluded jammers are employed. Our work confirms
the feasibility of effectively coping with jamming using intelligent
local controller switching in the smart communication subsystem
and is the first step towards providing the self-healing feature in a
smart grid under adversarial conditions. Our main contributions in
this paper are summarized as follows:
• We propose a framework that exploits intelligent controller
switching together with channel hopping to provide re-
silience of data delivery under jamming in a distribution
network.
• We develop a retransmission scheme integrated with the
proposed framework to further ensure successful data
delivery from smart meters.
• We perform a theoretical analysis of jamming probability
based on the impact of jammer transmission power and
shadowing effects.
• We build a testbed using Micaz motes implementing the
proposed intelligent controller switching strategy to show
the feasibility of such a framework.
• We conduct large-scale performance evaluations of our
framework with multiple independent and colluded jam-
mers using simulation studies.
• We analyze the optimal placement of local controllers to
ensure effective switching of smart meters under jamming.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We put our
work in the broader context in Section 2. In Section 3, we
describe the smart grid network architecture and the attack model
adopted in this work. We then present our proposed framework
enabling intelligent local controller switching in Section 4. Next,
we provide the theoretical analysis of our proposed strategy
in Section 5. We describe the testbed implementation of local
controller switching with channel hopping and our experimental
result in Section 6. The extensive performance evaluation is con-
ducted through simulation in Section 7. In Section 8, we analyze
the optimal coverage of local controller placement that supports
intelligent local controller switching. Finally, we conclude our
work in Section 9.
2 RELATED WORK
Jamming attacks are serious security threats disrupting reliability
of wireless communication, and have been extensively studied in
wireless networks [8], [10]–[13]. For example, jamming attack
detection was studied by Liu et al. [10], [13] in the context
of commodity wireless devices and wireless sensor networks.
Besides jamming attack detection, spread spectrum techniques
including both Frequency Hopping (FH) and Direct Sequence
Spread Spectrum (DSSS) have been widely used to defend against
jamming attacks in wireless communications [9], [14], [15] at the
expense of advanced transceivers. In particular, for Frequency-
Hopping Spread Spectrum (FHSS) [9], a transmitter and receiver
synchronously switch among many different frequency channels
following a common pseudo-random hopping sequence known
to each other. If the number of frequency channels is large
enough, it will greatly increase the cost of jamming attacks, since
the jammer either needs to know the pseudo-random hopping
sequence or should be able to mount the jamming attack across a
wide frequency band. For DSSS [14], [15], the receiver multiplies
each data bit with a Pseudo-Noise (PN) digital signal which is
transmitted at a higher rate than the data, consequently the data
will be spread over a wider frequency bandwidth. This makes the
legitimate signal hard to detect by attackers and also allows for
easier bit recovery by providing bit level error correction. The
two spread spectrum techniques above do not eliminate jamming
but force attackers to spend more energy to mount an equivalent
attack. Furthermore, several uncoordinated frequency hopping
(UFH) schemes have been proposed to enable jamming-resistant
communication in the presence of jamming attacks without a
pre-shared secret [12], [16]–[18]. Particularly, the shared secret
between transmitter and receiver is established via the Uncoordi-
nated Seed Disclosure in Frequency Hopping under the presence
of jamming. Besides FHSS and DSSS, other defense strategies
include the use of error correcting codes [19] to increase the
likelihood of decoding corrupted packets, spatial retreats [20]
to move out of jammed regions geographically, anti-jamming
timing channels [21], wormhole-based anti-jamming techniques
[22], Multi-Channel Ratio (MCR) Decoding [23], and localizing
jammers for physically neutralizing the jamming attacks [24]–
[26].
Recently, a few works have been focused on studying jamming
attacks in the context of smart grid applications. Li et al. discussed
Denial-of-Service (DoS) jamming of wireless communication in
the smart grid and studied the possibility of manipulating the
power market by jamming the pricing signal [5], [27]. Lu et
al. provided a study on the impact of jamming attacks against
time-critical network applications (e.g. power grids), and observed
that generating a fair amount of camouflage traffic in the network
could minimize the message delay for the smart grid applications
under jamming attacks [4], [28]. Su et al. studied the anti-jamming
problem in a multi-radio multi-channel multihop (M3) network
for supporting the smart grid from a cross-layer perspective,
and proposed a dynamic channel assignment algorithm based on
the analysis of the capacity of the victimized links via machine
learning algorithms [29]. Unlike the previous work, we focus
on designing a self-healing communication subsystem with local
controller switching that is robust against jamming attacks. Our
work is novel in that we exploit all the available channels between
smart meters and controllers to increase the data delivery rate
under jamming.
3 SYSTEM OVERVIEW
3.1 Smart Grid Network Architecture
In this work, we adopt the smart grid architecture described in [1]
which consists of three major systems, namely smart infrastruc-
ture, smart management and smart protection systems.
3Fig. 1. Architecture of the smart grid distribution network and illustration
of jammer deployment.
We focus on the smart communication subsystem which sup-
ports the smart information subsystem within the smart infrastruc-
ture system for distribution networks as shown in Figure 1. Typ-
ically, such a communication subsystem is hierarchical in nature
with devices within each geographical region forming different
subnetworks. A typical smart grid communication subsystem con-
sists of one or more substations, with each substation supervising
the operations of multiple local controllers in a particular region.
The substation is responsible for the information aggregation
from all the local controllers. Each local controller interacts with
multiple smart meters for supporting power consumption read-
ing collection, operation data management, and data acquisition
control. The smart meters within a geographical region com-
municate with a local controller via ZigBee-based radios while
the local controllers communicate with one another via wireless
mesh network. Furthermore, the local controllers communicate
with the substation controller via power line communications or
cellular networks. Thus, the smart grid communication subsystem
comprises the ZigBee networks, the wireless mesh networks and
the cellular networks
We assume that the smart grid communication subsystem is
designed such that any smart meter can communicate with several
local controllers, but it has only one primary local controller
to which it delivers power consumption readings during normal
operations. Smart meters do not communicate with one another.
Under normal operations, a local controller broadcasts beacons in
a particular channel and smart meters scan all channels to find
nearby local controllers to associate with.
3.2 Attack Model
The shared nature of the wireless medium creates opportunities
for adversaries employing jammers to disrupt data delivery be-
tween smart meters and local controllers in the smart grid, from
delayed delivery of time-critical messages to complete denial-
of-service [3], [30]. As the network has multiple channels, the
jammer can adopt a wide range of strategies to disrupt message
delivery. The attacker possesses the knowledge of the available
channels between a local controller and smart meters under its
coverage. Thus, a jammer could target a particular local controller
to disrupt its communication. Furthermore, we assume that a
jammer can only disturb the message communication in one
channel at each time slot.
We consider two major jamming types: random and reactive.
A random jammer randomly selects a channel used between a
local controller and smart meters at each time slot and disrupts
the data communication without monitoring the channel activities,
while a reactive jammer monitors a channel and only launches the
attack when there are activities on the channel.
In addition, we consider both single and multiple stationary
jammers. With multiple jammers, we further consider independent
versus colluded jammers. With multiple independent jammers, the
communications between smart meters and local controllers in
multiple channels could be disrupted at each time slot. Multiple
colluded jammers can collaboratively launch an attack targeting a
particular channel at a time slot, causing severe channel interfer-
ence.
4 FRAMEWORK OF INTELLIGENT LOCAL CON-
TROLLER SWITCHING WITH CHANNEL HOPPING
(LCS-CH)
Previous studies mainly rely on channel hopping techniques [8],
[9], [12], [17] to mitigate jamming attacks in wireless networks.
The basic idea of the channel hopping technique is: the communi-
cation between the sender and receiver at any particular time slot
takes place using a particular channel chosen from a sequence of
pre-defined channels (referred to as a hopping sequence), which
are pre-loaded into communication devices. Typically communi-
cations between smart meters and local controllers are based on
802.15.4-equivalent radios which only have a fixed number of
available channels. For a large deployment scenario where we
need to consider having multiple local controllers operating on
independent channels, each local controller can only be assigned
a limited number of channels. Thus, despite the recent success
of employing channel hopping techniques to achieve jamming
resilient wireless communication, limited channel resources avail-
able on each local controller make the channel hopping technique
insufficient to defend against jamming attacks in a smart grid.
The jammers with fast hopping speed would make a pure channel
hopping scheme less effective, since the jammer can quickly find
the channel in use between the local controller and smart meters.
Therefore, we propose a framework that actively performs local
controller switching with channel hopping to thwart jamming
attacks. With our proposed framework, a smart meter can utilize
all available channels from nearby local controllers to send its
readings, and hence increase the chances of such readings being
successfully collected by one of the nearby local controllers under
jamming, and subsequently by the substation.
4.1 Framework Design
In this work, we focus on alleviating jamming effects on smart
meters and local controllers after an attack is detected. Thus, we
assume that the network is able to detect the presence of jammers
using existing techniques [8], [10]. For instance, the interference
from jammers degrades the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) of any
received packet from a smart meter, the packet may not be de-
codable at the corresponding local controller. When a consecutive
sequence of packets are undecodable, the network concludes that
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Fig. 2. Framework overview.
there is a jammer present. We propose a framework such that each
smart meter is associated with a primary local controller and can
also communicate with a set of nearby local controllers. Each local
controller is pre-configured with a number of channel hopping
sequences. The length of each channel hopping sequence is the
same for all local controllers. The channel used in any particular
time slot within a hopping sequence of a particular local controller
does not overlap with any nearby local controllers. The channel
hopping technique is triggered by the affected local controllers
after a jamming attack is detected.
We assume that this communication subsystem runs as a time-
slotted system, i.e. at each time slot, the local controller can decide
which frequency channel it will use to communicate with smart
meters that are associated with it. Our framework contains three
main aspects: initial configuration in the smart grid, real-time
channel hopping sequence synchronization between smart meters
and the local controller under jamming, and intelligent local
controller switching to alleviate jamming and increase successful
data delivery rate.
Initial Configuration. All the channel hopping sequences
are generated and distributed by the substation, which manages
a set of local controllers. In our framework, we consider a
hybrid deployment of static and dynamic local controllers. In
particular, static local controllers are permanently placed by a
utility company, while dynamic local controllers could be utility
trucks driving around to collect data from smart meters. During
the deployment of a static local controller, it is uploaded with a
number of channel hopping sequences, which ensures that nearby
local controllers have no collision with each other on channel
hopping. The dynamic local controllers are also pre-configured
with multiple channel hopping sequences.
Real-Time Channel Hopping Sequence Synchronization.
When jamming is detected by the network by employing existing
techniques [8], [10], smart meters and local controllers need to
synchronize with each other to perform channel hopping. The af-
fected local controllers (including both static and dynamic) utilize
the one-time pseudo-random hopping pattern technique [12] to
send out new beacons. Each new beacon message includes the
channel hopping sequence, selected from the pre-configured set of
channel hopping sequences, and the corresponding starting time
of channel hopping. Such beacons are transmitted multiple times,
each using a different pseudo-random hopping pattern, to ensure
the information can be received by all the relevant smart meters.
Intelligent Local Controller Switching. Since smart me-
ters have the opportunity to find more than one available local
controllers in our framework, they can choose to switch to the
appropriate nearby local controllers once they receive the channel
hopping sequences from them. In our framework, each smart meter
can actively decide which nearby local controller to connect to at
each time slot, and hence increase the successful data delivery
rate under jamming. In case no overlapping local controller is
available for a particular smart meter, then only frequency hopping
technique will be employed.
4.2 Collision-Free Channel Hopping Sequence Distri-
bution
To defend against the jamming attack via the channel hopping
technique, the substation constructs and distributes a set of chan-
nel hopping sequences to each local controller. The predefined
hopping sequences among nearby local controllers should fol-
low the collision-free principle, where any two channel hopping
sequences have no interference with each other. The technique
for constructing collision-free channel hopping sequences can be
based on finite field theory from existing work [9]. To illustrate
the collision-free channel hopping sequence distribution, we use
an example when each local controller is assigned with only
one channel hopping sequence. Assume 4 local controllers are
deployed in the area of interest. There are a total of 20 available
channels. Each local controller has one hopping sequence contain-
ing 5 channels for communicating with smart meters. The channel
hopping pattern for these 4 local controllers can then be designed
as follows:
LC1
LC2
LC3
LC4
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
1 5 9 13 17
2 6 10 14 18
3 7 11 15 19
4 8 12 16 20
⎤
⎥⎥⎦ .
where each row corresponds to the channel hopping sequence of
one particular local controller LCi with i = 1, · · · , 4 at different
time slots; each column corresponds to the channels for 4 local
controllers at one particular time slot tj with j = 1, · · · , 5.
When a jamming attack is detected, each affected local
controller chooses from its pre-configured collision-free channel
hopping sequence and starts sending out beacons by following
a one-time pseudo-random hopping pattern [12]. The beacon
message contains the local controller’s identifier, the selected
channel hopping sequence, and the starting time for channel
hopping. The beacon message is transmitted multiple times by
following different pseudo-random hopping patterns. Each trans-
mission is independent of each other. Each affected smart meter
randomly hops through all channels, and eventually it will have
an overlapping channel with a local controller and receive the
disclosed channel hopping sequence. Since each smart meter can
communicate with several nearby local controllers, it is possible
that the smart meter can receive the channel hopping sequence
from multiple local controllers. However, merely using the channel
hopping technique is not sufficient to maintain high data delivery
5rate under jamming as a jammer may follow the same procedure
as smart meters to learn the channel hopping sequences in the
affected area.
4.3 Intelligent Local Controller Switching with Channel
Hopping (LCS-CH)
Our objective is to make use of all the available channels from
nearby local controllers so as to maintain regular data delivery
under jamming. To achieve this goal, we leverage the collaborative
efforts from a smart meter’s nearby local controllers. Instead of
relying on the pure channel hopping technique, which has limited
capability on defending against jamming attacks, we propose
active local controller switching on top of channel hopping to
increase successful data delivery rate.
We next describe how a smart meter comes up with a strategy
to perform active local controller switching under jamming. Let
us denote the channel hopping sequence Fi of the local controller
LCi as a k-length vector:
Fi = [fi,1, fi,2, · · · , fi,j, · · · , fi,k] (1)
where fi,j corresponds to a particular channel in the frequency
hopping sequence at jth time slot with 1 ≤ j ≤ k. Considering all
neighboring local controllers with collision-free channel hopping
sequences, the smart meter defines its channel selection matrix as:
FI×k =
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
f1,1 f1,2 · · · f1,k−1 f1,k
f2,1 f2,2 · · · f2,k−1 f2,k
· · · · · ·
fI,1 fI,2 · · · fI,k−1 fI,k
⎤
⎥⎥⎦ ,
where each row corresponds to the selected channel hopping
sequence for one nearby local controller and again fi,j represents
the channel at jth time slot of a neighboring local controller LCi.
The smart meter constructs FI×k after real-time channel hopping
sequence synchronization.
The smart meter then constructs the controller switching ma-
trix UI×k based on the channel hopping sequence received from
nearby local controllers:
UI×k = [u1, · · · , uj , · · · , uk], (2)
where uj represents a I-length column vector that has only one
non-zero entry with uTj uj = 1 and j = 1, · · · , k time slots. It
represents which local controller is selected at jth time slot during
channel hopping. Furthermore, uj(i) = 1 indicates that the smart
meter chooses ith local controller at jth time slot with 1 ≤ j ≤ k.
For instance, u2 = [0, 0, 0, 1, 0] means the smart meter choose
the fourth local controller at the second time slot.
Integrating the channel selection and controller switching
matrices, the smart meter can then derive its channel hopping
strategy as follows:
S1×k = 11×I(FI×k  UI×k) (3)
where  represents element-wise product. Such a strategy ensures
the smart meter finds an available channel to deliver data at any
time slot under jamming. Although the jammers may have the
capability to learn all the selected channel hopping sequences by
eavesdropping in the affected area, jammers do not have the ability
to jam all the channels at the same time. Figure 3 illustrates our
intelligent local controller switching scheme. When only channel
hopping is used as shown in Figure 3 (a), a smart meter hops
among multiple channels of the primary local controllers. When
there are multiple local controllers nearby, a smart meter can
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4 1
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Fig. 3. Illustration of intelligent local controller switching scheme.
switch among these local controllers for data delivery. Using active
local controller switching with channel hopping, a smart meter can
take advantages of all available channels from different nearby
local controllers as shown in Figure 3 (b).
4.4 Retransmission Scheme
After SMs send their packets to a particular LC, the LC needs
to acknowledge to these SMs whether their packets have been
successfully received. Otherwise, if some packets from the SMs
are lost due to jamming, the relevant information from smart
meters would be missed by the control center. To minimize such
losses, we design a retransmission scheme between any LC and
SMs in our proposed framework.
The basic idea is that a particular LC reserves several time slots
to inform the SMs under its coverage of any successfully received
packets, and in subsequent time slots relevant SMs will re-transmit
packets that are not received. Each SM selects its retransmission
slot based on its unique identifier. The information flow of the
retransmission mechanism is shown in Figure 4:
Step 1. Each packet transmitted by a SM is given a unique
sequence number, and marked with the identifier (ID) of that SM.
Then, the packet is sent to the particular LC at different time slots
which is defined in the local controller switching matrix shown in
Equation 2. Note that each local controller switching matrix spans
T time slots.
Step 2. The LC collects the packets from multiple SMs in
successive mT time slots, and saves the sequence numbers and
the corresponding IDs of SMs contained in these successfully
received packets. After several rounds of packet transmission
lasting for mT time slots, the next T time slots, which are shown
as (m + 1)T in Figure 4, are reserved for LC to acknowledge
SMs on which packets are successfully received. The Ack packet,
which is broadcasted at every (m + 1)T time slots, contains all
the received packet sequence numbers and their corresponding
SMs’ IDs. This Ack packet is sent repeatedly several times over
different channels as chosen according to Equation 2. We assume
that the information received in these (m+1)T time slots will be
useful for the decision process at the control center. Such repeated
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Fig. 4. Retransmission mechanism.
transmissions serve two purposes: (i) they reduce the probability
of the ACK packet being jammed; (ii) since SMs received Acks
from multiple nearby LCs, the SMs and LCs may not always be
in the same channel. Multiple transmissions of the Ack packet can
increase the chance of packet reception by the SMs even if they
are not on the same channel as the corresponding LC at certain
time slots.
Step 3. Once the SMs receive the acknowledgment packets
from a LC, the lost packets, whose sequence numbers do not
appear in the Ack, will be transmitted again. If any SM does
not receive the Ack packet, it will just wait until another round of
reserved time slots to receive later acknowledgment from that LC,
and perform the retransmission accordingly.
Through the above steps, both LCs and SMs keep track of the
lost packets under jamming and retransmit them again so that the
data loss from SMs will be minimized.
5 ANALYSIS OF LOCAL CONTROLLER SWITCHING
WITH CHANNEL HOPPING (LCS-CH)
5.1 Jamming Probability of Local Controller Switching
With Channel Hopping (LCS-CH)
In this section, we derive the probability that a smart meter cannot
deliver its data to a local controller under jamming. We refer such
a probability as jamming probability. We compare the jamming
probability when using merely channel hopping technique to
applying local controller switching with channel hopping (LCS-
CH) after the jamming attack is detected.
Under jamming, the received power at a local controller is
from both the smart meter it communicates with (PLCi,SMj ) and
the jammer (PLCi,J ). We use a single jammer as an example and
describe the received power at local controller LCi using a log-
distance path loss propagation model:
PLCi,SMj = PT − PL0 − 10γ1og10(
dLCi,SMj
d0
)−Xg
PLCi,J = PJ − PL0 − 10γ1og10(
dLCi,J
d0
)−Xg,
(4)
where PT and PJ represent the transmission power of the smart
meter and the jammer. Xg is a Gaussian random variable with
distribution N(0, σ2), reflecting the attenuation caused by flat
fading. dLCi,J and dLCi,SMj are the distances from smart meter
and jammer to local controller respectively.
When the communication between the local controller LCi
and the smart meter SMj on the channel fk is disrupted by the
jammer, the signal-to-noise ratio (at the local controller LCi from
smart meter SMj) SNRkLCi,SMj is less than a threshold γ0. This
signal-to-noise ratio can be represented as:
SNRkLCi,SMj = PLCi,SMj − PLCi,J ∼ N(μ, 2σ2)
∼ N(PT − PJ − 10γ1og10(
dLCi,SMj
dLCi,J
), 2σ2).
(5)
Then the possibility that a jammer successfully disrupts the
communication between SMj and LCi on channel fk depends
on the propagation model. And the jamming probability can be
represented as:
Prob(SNRkLCi,SMj < γ0) =
∫ γ0
−∞
1
2σ
√
π
e−
(SNRkLCi,SMj
−μ)2
4σ2 .
(6)
When only the traditional frequency hopping technique is
used under jamming, SMj can communicate with its primary
local controller LCi through a set of independent channels from
the selected channel hopping sequence. The jamming probability
Prob(SMj)
CH between LCi and SMj at time slot t can then
be derived as:
Prob(SMj)
CH
=Prob(fJ (t) = fk & f
SMj (t) = fk
∣∣∣SNRkLCi,SMj < γ0)
× Prob(SNRkLCi,SMj < γ0)
=Prob(fJ (t) = fk)Prob(f
SMj (t) = fk)
× Prob(SNRkLCi,SMj < γ0)
=
1
Ni × n
∫ γ0
−∞
1
2σ
√
π
e−
(SNRkLCi,SMj
−μ)2
4σ2 ,
(7)
where fJ(t) and fSMj (t) represent the channels used by the
jammer and smart meter SMj at time slot t. n indicates the
number of channels that the jammer tries to disrupt, and Ni is
the total number of channels in the selected hopping sequence on
LCi. fk is one of the available channels on single local controller.
When our proposed LCS-CH framework is applied, the smart
meter SMj actively perform local controller switching. Assume
there are I nearby local controllers (with LCi, i = 1, · · · , I)
available for the smart meter SMj to switch independently. The
jamming probability Prob(SMj)LCS−CH for SMj becomes:
Prob(SMj)
LCS−CH
=
I∑
i=1
Prob(fJ (t) = fk & f
SMj (t) = fk
∣∣∣SNRkLCi,SMj < γ0)
× Prob
(
SNRkLCi,SMj < γ0
∣∣∣LCi)× Prob(LCi)
(8)
The first term in equation 8 represents the jamming probability
for a single local controller, which is the same as equation 7. In
addition, the probability for a particular smart meter switching
among I local controllers can be represented as Prob(LCi) = 1I .
Therefore, we can further derive as follows:
7Prob(SMj)
LCS−CH
=
I∑
i=1
1
n×NiProb(SNR
k
LCi,SMj < γ0)×
1
I
=
1
I × n
I∑
i=1
(
1
Ni
∫ γ0
−∞
1
2σ
√
π
e−
(SNRkLCi,SMj
−μ)2
4σ2
)
<Prob(SMj)
CH .
(9)
Therefore, the jamming probability of a smart meter under the
LCS-CH scheme is lower than that under the CH scheme. And
smart meters have higher possibility to deliver the data success-
fully to local controllers.
5.2 Impact of Jamming Power and Shadowing Effect on
Jamming Probability
In this subsection, we discuss the impact of the jamming
power and the shadowing channel on the jamming probability
of the communication between LC and SM. Increasing jamming
power typically causes more severe interference at LC which will
result in higher jamming probability. However, how the shadowing
factor, which represents the variations of the wireless channel,
affects the jamming probability depends on both the jammer’s
transmission power and the SNR threshold. We are thus interested
in the jamming probability under the impact of jamming power
and shadowing. The following theoretical analysis focuses on
one pair of LC and SM with the presence of single jammer. We
provide the statistical results on the jamming probability involving
multiple pairs of LCs and SMs in later section.
Assuming λ is the SNR threshold for jamming detection for
the channel between LC and SM, the jamming probability can be
represented as:
ProbJ = 1− Prob(PR > λ)
= 1−
∫ +∞
PR=λ
1
σR
√
2π
e
− (PR−μR)2
2σ2
R dPR
=
∫ PR=λ
−∞
1
σR
√
2π
e
− (PR−μR)2
2σ2
R dPR
(10)
where PR = (PT − PJ) ∼ Gauss(μR, σ2R), μR = PT − PJ .
PR is the SNR at LC, PT is the received transmission power from
SM, and PJ is the received transmission power from jammer.
1. We first study the jamming probability affected by jammer
transmission power. Given two different jammer transmission
power PJ and PJ+ΔPJ , where ΔPJ > 0, the expected received
jamming power are μR and μR −ΔPJ respectively. We assume
the jamming probabilities for the two different received jamming
power are ProbJ and Prob′J with fixed shadowing factor σR and
SNR threshold λ. Then we have:
ProbJ − Prob′J =
∫ λ
−∞
1
σR
√
2π
e
− (PR−μR)2
2σ2
R dPR
−
∫ λ
−∞
1
σR
√
2π
e
− (PR−(μR−ΔPJ ))2
2σ2
R dPR
= φ(
λ− (μR −ΔPJ)
σR
)− φ(λ − μR
σR
).
(11)
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Fig. 5. Illustration of jamming probability on the wireless channel with
different shadowing factors.
According to the property of Gaussian distribution, it is straight-
forward to find that when PJ increases, the jamming probability
ProbJ also increases.
∀λ,ΔPJ > 0, σR → ⇒ ProbJ ↑ (12)
where → represents the value keeps constant, and ↑ represents the
value is increasing.
2. We next analyze how the shadowing factor affects the
jamming probability. When the shadowing factor σ2R increases,
the jamming probability is not a monotone function, which can
be illustrated from the example shown in Figure 5. With a fixed
received jamming power, when the SNR threshold is larger than
the ratio between the received transmission power from jammer
and SM, the jamming probability Prob1J for the wireless channel
with small variation is higher than the probability Prob2J for the
channel with larger variation. Theoretically, the change of jam-
ming probability with respect to shadowing factor is summarized
as follows:
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
λ > μR,ΔPJ = 0, σR ↑ ⇒ ProbJ = 1− φ(λ−μRσR ) ↓
λ = μR,ΔPJ = 0, σR ↑ ⇒ ProbJ = 1− φ(0) →
λ < μR,ΔPJ = 0, σR ↑ ⇒ ProbJ = 1− φ(λ−μRσR ) ↑(13)
where ↓ represents the value is decreasing.
3. Integrating the impact of the jamming power and the shad-
owing factor, we find that the jamming probability is not a mono-
tone function with respect to the channel variation while jammer
transmission power is increasing. Particularly, when λ ≤ μR and
ΔPJ > 0, it is straightforward to derive from Equation 12 and 13
that the jamming probability ProbJ increases when increasing the
channel variation:
λ ≤ μR,ΔPJ > 0, σR ↑ ⇒ ProbJ ↑ . (14)
When λ > μR and ΔPJ > 0, in order to analyze the change
of jamming probability, we seek to determine such a relationship
ΔPJ = f(ΔσR) between increased jamming power ΔPJ and
increased shadowing factor ΔσR that would result in constant
jamming probability. For ΔPJ > f(ΔσR) or ΔPJ < f(ΔσR),
the jamming probability follows different trends. Given two pairs
of received jamming power and shadowing factor, i.e., [PR, σR]
and [PR +ΔPJ , σ′R = σR +ΔσR], where σR and σ′R are two
different shadowing factors and ΔσR > 0, the resulted jamming
probabilities are ProbJ and Prob′J satisfying the following
condition:
8ProbJ = Prob
′
J
1− Prob(PR > λ) = 1− Prob′(PR > λ) (15)
We then expand the above equation and obtain the relationship
between increased jammer transmission power ΔPJ and the two
shadowing factors σR and σ′R as follows:∫ +∞
PR=λ
1
σR
√
2Π
e
− (PR−μR)2
2σ2
R dPR =∫ +∞
PR=λ
1
σ′R
√
2Π
e
− (PR−(μR−ΔPJ ))2
2(σ′
R
)2 dPR
(16)
⇒ φ
(
λ− μR
σR
)
= φ
(
λ− (μR −ΔPJ )
σ′R
)
⇒ λ− μR
σR
=
λ− (μR −ΔPJ)
σ′R
(17)
⇒ λσ′R − μRσ′R = λσR − μRσR +ΔPJσR (18)
⇒ ΔPJ = (λ− μR)(σ
′
R − σR)
σR
=
(λ− μR)
σR
ΔσR = f(ΔσR).
(19)
Given the relationship ΔPJ = (λ−μR)σR ΔσR and the SNR thresh-
old λ > μR, from the above analysis we find that the jamming
probability keeps constant. Further, it is also straightforward to
obtain that ProbJ decreases when ΔPJ > (λ−μR)σR ΔσR, while
increases when ΔPJ < (λ−μR)σR ΔσR. Therefore, when both thejamming power and the shadowing factor vary we can conclude
that the jamming probability will present the following trend:⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
λ > μR,ΔPJ >
(λ−μR)
σR
ΔσR,ΔσR > 0 ⇒ ProbJ ↓
λ > μR,ΔPJ =
(λ−μR)
σR
ΔσR,ΔσR > 0 ⇒ ProbJ →
λ > μR,ΔPJ <
(λ−μR)
σR
ΔσR,ΔσR > 0 ⇒ ProbJ ↑
λ ≤ μR,ΔPJ > 0 ⇒ ProbJ ↑
(20)
The above analysis shows that the jamming probability does not
follow a monotonic changing trend when changing the jamming
power or shadowing factor.
Given a smart grid network including multiple LCs distributed
in a wide area, which have different distances from the jammer,
it would result in different received jamming power at different
LCs. Further, as the shadowing factor is dominated by different
wireless environment and channel condition, it varies under dif-
ferent environments. For example, the downtown or residential
area suffers from severe multi-path effects due to many high-
rise buildings, which leads to large channel variation; whereas
the suburban area experiences less multi-path effects, resulting in
small channel variation.
Integrating the impact of jamming power and shadowing
factor, the jamming probability would follow an irregular pattern
for a smart grid network. Since the received jamming power is
governed by the distances from jammers and shadowing factors,
the jamming probability study above thus provides insightful
information on identifying useful features of jammers including
jamming power and hopping patterns and understanding how
environmental factors (i.e. shadowing effects) would affect the
efficiency of jamming. In Section 7.4, we evaluate the jamming
probability under the impact from jamming power and shadowing
factor for a specific simulated network distribution.
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Fig. 6. Experimental Evaluation of LCS-CH in ZigBee Network
6 IMPLEMENTATION OF CONTROLLER SWITCHING
SCHEME IN ZIGBEE NETWORK
The smart communication subsystem for smart meters and local
controllers is usually deployed using a ZigBee network [1]. It is
thus essential to show the feasibility of applying the proposed
local controller switching scheme in the ZigBee network besides
providing theoretical analysis for our framework in Section 5.
We build a testbed using MicaZ motes that implement our local
controller switching scheme and evaluate its performance when a
jammer is present. MicaZ sensor nodes have a 2.4 − 2.48GHz
Chipcon CC2420 Radio and communicate using the ZigBee
protocol.
6.1 Testbed Setup
Our testbed consists of 6 motes with 4 acting as smart meters
(SMj , j = 1, · · · , 4) and 2 as local controllers (LCi, i =
1, · · · , 2), and a 7th mote deployed as a jammer. The two local
controllers can forward the collected data from smart meters to
the substation, which is represented by a mote base-station. Each
smart meter communicates to one primary local controller with
SM2 and SM3 covered by both local controllers. During our
experiments, the jammer transmits with a higher transmission
power (7dBm) than smart meters (5dBm). Two testing scenarios
with each local controller having 3 and 5 available channels
respectively are conducted.
6.2 Implementation and Results
We implement LCS-CH on motes and compare it with pure
channel hopping technique. We emulate two operating scenarios
in the smart grid under jamming: (1) smart meters communicate
with their primary local controllers using a predefined channel
hopping sequence; and (2) smart meters actively switch between
local controllers using their respective channel hopping sequences.
During testing, we allow the system to operate using pure channel
hopping and LCS-CH schemes for 5 minutes each with a packet
sending rate from the smart meter set at 4pkt/sec. We then
examine the packet loss ratio at the substation. The results are
presented in figure 6. We observe that our proposed LCS-CH
scheme significantly outperforms pure channel hopping scheme
with much lower packet loss ratio under jamming with over 40%
and 60% improvement for 3 and 5 channel cases respectively. This
small-scale testbed study confirms the feasibility of implementing
local controller switching technique in the ZigBee network.
7 SIMULATION EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate the effectiveness of our LCS-CH
scheme under different types and different numbers of jammers
through a simulated smart grid communication subsystem.
97.1 Simulation Setup
The smart grid communication system is simulated using Mat-
lab 2013b running on the desktop with Intel i7 CPU and 4G
memory. Our simulated smart grid communication subsystem is
a 500m× 500m square area with 200 smart meters and 40 or 60
local controllers randomly placed. Each smart meter is associated
with its closest local controller as its primary local controller and
can transmit at 4pkt/sec when accessing to the wireless chan-
nel. To simulate the wireless channel, we adopt the log-normal
shadowing model for signal propagation and the parameters are
set following a typical outdoor environment modeled by many
previous works [31]–[34]: PL0 = 4, γ = 0.6, d0 = 5 and
Xg is the shadow fading which follows the zero mean Gaussian
distribution with the variance varying from 0 to 3dBm2. The
default transmission power of jammers is 20dBm, while it is
17dBm for smart meters. The SNR threshold is set to 3dB for
jamming detection.
The simulation is conducted as follows: All smart meters are
ready to transmit when the simulation starts while the jammer also
starts to hop among available channels in an attempt to disrupt the
communications between smart meters and their local controllers.
Each local controller is assigned with 5 channels. The smart
meters are following the channel hopping sequence defined by the
proposed LCS-CH framework to communicate with neighboring
local controllers including the primary local controller, while the
jammer randomly hops among the channels associated with the
target local controller. Particularly, we set the jammer hopping
rate as 12channel/sec, which is three times that of a smart
meter’s hopping rate (i.e., 4channel/sec). The collision occurs
when smart meter and jammer hop to the same channel. In our
simulation, we consider varying number (either one or multiple)
of random and reactive jammers which are randomly placed in the
simulation area. For multiple jammers, we study both independent
and colluded jammers and use two jammers as a representative
example. We ran the simulation for each scenario 10, 000 times to
obtain relevant statistical results.
7.2 Metrics
We define Jammed Slot Ratio (JSR) to evaluate the effectiveness of
our proposed LCS-CH scheme. We first define κi(t) as the status
(i.e., jammed or not jammed) at the smart meter SMi during time
slot t:
κi(t) = 1 jammed;
κi(t) = 0 not jammed.
(21)
We further use κsi (t) to represent the status of the smart meter
SMi at time slot t when our proposed LCS-CH scheme (i.e., with
local controller switching) is applied.
The JSR is then defined as the ratio between the number of
jammed time slots to the number of un-jammed ones of the smart
meter under jamming is present.
Jammed Slot Ratio (JSR). When LCS-CH is applied, the JSR
is represented as:
JSRs =
∑T
t=1
∑M
i=1 κ
s
i (t)
M × T , (22)
where T is the total number of time slots under study and M
is the number of smart meters. Similarly, when only the channel
hopping (CH) technique is applied, the JSR becomes:
JSR =
∑T
t=1
∑M
i=1 κi(t)
M × T . (23)
0.5 1 2 30
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Noise Variance (dBm2)
Ja
m
m
ed
 S
lo
t R
at
io
LCS−CH (Random)
Pure CH (Random)
LCS−CH (Reactive)
Pure CH (Reactive)
(a) 40 LCs
0.5 1 2 30
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Noise Variance (dBm2)
Ja
m
m
ed
 S
lo
t R
at
io
LCS−CH (Random)
Pure CH (Random)
LCS−CH (Reactive)
Pure CH (Reactive)
(b) 60 LCs
Fig. 7. Single jammer case: Comparison of Jammed Slot Ratio (JSR)
between LCS-CH and Pure CH.
Improvement Percentage (η). We further define the JSR
improvement percentage, which represents the percentage of
jamming slot ratio reduced under the LCS-CH scheme when
compared with the pure channel hopping scheme, as:
η =
JSR− JSRs
JSR
. (24)
7.3 Results
7.3.1 Single Jammer case
We first study the performance of our proposed framework when
a single jammer is present. Figure 7 (a) and (b) depict the JSR
comparison between the proposed LCS-CH scheme and pure
frequency hopping (i.e., Pure FH) scheme under both random and
reactive jammers when the variance of shadowing is varied from
0dBm2 to 3dBm2 with 40 and 60 local controllers, respectively.
We observe that the JSR of the LCS-CH scheme is substantially
less than that of the pure FH scheme under both 40 and 60 local
controllers settings. This observation indicates that the proposed
scheme has a much lower jammed slot ratio, and thus has sig-
nificantly performance improvement over the Pure FH scheme.
Specifically, JSR drops from 17.1% (15.1%) to 4.8% (3.9%)
with 40 (60) local controllers when the variance of shadowing
is 1dBm2 under random jamming. Similarly, for the reactive
jammer, JSR drops from 29% (26%) to 8.3% (6.7%) with 40 (60)
local controllers when the variance of shadowing is 1dBm2. This
is because the proposed LCS-CH scheme provides more flexibility
on channel hopping among multiple local controllers. It is thus
harder for a jammer to disrupt the communication between smart
meters and local controllers. We also find that the JSR of the
proposed scheme under 60 local controllers is smaller than that
of under 40 local controllers, indicating each smart meter having
more choices for channel switching when more local controllers
are deployed.
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Fig. 8. Two jammers case: Comparison of JSR between LCS-CH and
Pure CH with 40 local controllers.
Furthermore, we observe that the JSR is increasing as the noise
power (i.e., variance of shadowing) increases. This is because
a higher noise power results in a lower signal-to-noise ratio,
which affects the communication between local controllers and
smart meters even in normal conditions. This causes the decreas-
ing of the number of local controllers that a smart meter can
communicate with, especially those which are located relatively
farther away from the smart meter. When the noise power is
large enough (e.g., larger than 3dBm2), the smart meter could
only maintain the communication with its primary local controller
(assuming the primary local controller is the closest controller
to the smart meter). This will make the JSR under the LCS-CH
scheme approaching to that of Pure FH scheme. But still, the
performance of LCS-CH is better than that of Pure FH scheme.
Additionally, we find that the reactive jammer is more harmful
than the random jammer. Once the reactive jammer captures one
active channel, it could disrupt all the packets transmitted during
the whole time slot. This is different from a random jammer, who
only disrupts the communication in a portion of one time slot due
to the fast hopping rate of jammers. Therefore, the JSR under a
reactive jammer is higher than that of a random jammer.
7.3.2 Multiple Independent Jammers case
We next examine how our framework reacts when there are
multiple independent jammers present in the smart grid commu-
nication subsystem. Figure 8(a) presents the JSR comparison of
the proposed LCS-CH scheme and pure FH scheme when two
jammers are present with 40 local controllers. We observe that
the JSR of the LCS-CH scheme is significantly lower than that
of the pure FH scheme for all studied cases using random and
reactive jammers respectively. As expected, when compared to
the single jammer case, the JSR of pure FH scheme increases
sharply under two jammers case due to more channels are affected
by multiple jammers. The JSR of our proposed LCS-CH under
two jammers is about twice of that under a single jammer case.
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Fig. 9. The JSR improvement percentage for single jammer under
different jammer transmission power with 40 and 60 local controllers,
respectively.
This is because having two jammers independently disrupt the
channels on a local controller results in similar performance as
the summation of JSRs from two independent jamming scenarios
with a single jammer. The performance under 60 local controllers
exhibits better performance than the 40 local controllers case but
was omitted due to space limitation.
7.3.3 Multiple Colluded Jammers Case
We further examine the case with multiple colluded jammers in
the smart grid communication subsystem. The JSR comparison
of the proposed LCS-CH scheme and pure FH scheme under
two colluded jammers with 40 local controllers are presented
in figure 8 (b). The performance under 60 local controllers is
again omitted due to space limitation. We find that the JSR of
our proposed LCS-CH is much better than that of pure FH. When
compared to the JSR under a single jammer, we observe that the
JSR of LCS-CH under two colluded jammers increases about only
0.5%, which indicates that colluded jammers have accumulated
impact on the channels between smart meters and local controllers.
Since the two jammers are randomly distributed in the testing
area, the accumulated impact is not that obvious compared with a
single jammer case. It also shows the robustness of our proposed
LCS-CH scheme when dealing with colluded jammers. Further,
we observe that having two colluded jammers is less harmful than
having two independent jammers for both LCS-CH and Pure FH
schemes from our simulation results.
7.3.4 Impact of Jamming Power
Finally, we study how our proposed framework behaves when
the jammer’s transmission power increases. We vary the jammer’s
transmission power from 17dBm to 30dBm, while maintaining
the transmission power of smart meters at 17dBm with constant
noise power level set at 1dBm2. Figure 9 depicts the JSR
improvement percentage of LCS-CH over Pure FH with both a
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Fig. 10. JSR under the impact of jamming power and shadowing factor for single pair of LC and SM.
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Fig. 11. Average JSR under the impact of jammer transmission power and shadowing factor across the network.
single random and reactive jammer cases respectively the trans-
mission power of the jammer is varied. We observe that our LCS-
CH achieves large JSR improvement (over 50%) under different
number of local controllers for both random and reactive jammers.
This is very encouraging as it indicates our framework is highly
effective when the adversary increases the jammer’s transmission
power. The JSR improvement becomes stable beyond 22dBm of
jammer transmission power. This is because the jammers with
low transmission power have limited impact on the signal-to-
noise ratio of the communication links between smart meters
and local controllers. They can mostly affect the communication
links between a smart meter and far away controllers. When the
jamming power increases, more communication links will get
affected. Once the transmission power of jammer becomes large
enough, the communication links between the smart meter and all
the local controllers will get affected resulting in low SNR if they
are on the same channel as the jammer. As the jamming power
increases, the jamming capability becomes saturated.
7.3.5 Impact of Jammer Transmission Power and Shadow-
ing Factor
We first study the jamming probability for a single pair of
SM and LC when varying jammer’s transmission power and
shadowing factor. Given the SM transmission power at 17dBm,
and the jammer transmission powers fixed at 10dBm, 14dBm
and 20dBm respectively, we examine the jamming slot ratio when
the shadowing factor varies from 0dBm to 10dBm. As shown
in Figure 10, the jamming slot ratio has different increasing or
decreasing trends as the shadowing factor is increased with dif-
ferent jamming powers. This observation matches our theoretical
analysis presented in Section 5. Particularly, the jammed slot ratio
decreases when increasing the shadowing factor with the jammer
transmission power of 10dBm, whereas the jammed slot ratio
increases when increasing the shadowing factor under the jammer
transmission power of 20dBm. When jammer transmission power
is 14dBm, the changes of the jammed slot ratio when increasing
the shadowing is related to the SNR threshold. In particular, the
jammed slot ratio decreases under the SNR threshold 0dBm and
2dBm, while it increases under the SNR threshold 4dBm and
6dBm.
We next study the impact of jammer transmission power and
shadowing factor on the jamming probability in a simulated smart
grid network, which consists of 60 LCs and 200 SMs randomly
distributed in a 500m × 500m area. We calculate the average
jamming slot ratio across the whole network, where the jamming
power changes from 17dBm to 21dBm, and the shadowing
factor varies from 0.5dBm to 3dBm. Given the fixed jammer
transmission power, we observe that the average jammed slot
ratio does not monotonically increase or decrease with respect to
shadowing factor, which is shown in Figure 11. Particularly, for the
proposed LCS-CH scheme, the jammed slot ratio decreases first
and then increases as the shadowing factor increases under the
lower jammer transmission powers (i.e., 17dBm and 18dBm),
while it keeps increasing with higher transmission powers (i.e.,
19dBm, 20dBm and 21dBm). Furthermore, the jammed slot
ratio of the pure channel hopping scheme is always higher than
that of the proposed LCS-CH scheme, which demonstrates the
effectiveness of our proposed scheme under different wireless
environments.
7.3.6 Throughput and Communication Overhead Study
with Retransmission Scheme
In this subsection, we first study the throughput under the pro-
posed framework after integrating with the retransmission scheme.
The throughput reflects the efficiency of the proposed framework,
and is defined as the average number of packets successively
delivered and acknowledged at LC per time slot (pkt/T ), where
T represents unit time slot. Note that each time slot only allows
to transmit one packet, and every 600 time slots of packets
transmission is followed by 30 time slots of acknowledgment for
successful packet delivery by LCs.
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Fig. 12. Throughput under different jammer transmission powers when
applying the retransmission scheme.
Figure 12 shows the channel throughput under different jam-
mer transmission powers for both random and reactive jammers.
Particularly, as the jammer transmission power increases from 17
dBm to 21 dBm, the throughput always maintains at high level
(i.e., above 0.95pkt/T and 0.9pkt/T for random and reactive
jammer respectively), which indicates that the proposed LCS-CH
framework is effective in defending against jamming attacks.
We also study the communication overhead incurred by the
proposed retransmission scheme. The communication overhead is
defined as the relative ratio between the number of retransmitted
data packets and the total number of data packets transmitted by
smart meters. Following the time slot arrangement in throughput
study, the communication overhead varying with the jammer
transmission power are presented in Figure 13. Specifically, the
communication overhead is as low as 2.8% and 5.2% for random
and reactive jammer respectively even when the transmission
power of jammer goes up to 21dBm. Such low communication
overhead confirms that the proposed retransmission scheme does
not incur high communication overhead.
8 OPTIMIZATION OF LOCAL CONTROLLER PLACE-
MENT
In Section 5.2, we study the jamming probability with fixed
distances between jammer and LCs & SMs by varying the jammer
transmission power and shadowing factor. In contrast, in this
section we consider another aspect of the proposed framework.
Assuming the jammer transmission power and shadowing factor
are fixed, we explore the placement of Local controllers to get
maximized overlapping coverage of smart meters. Generally, the
deployment of smart meters in a geographical area is usually
fixed. Given the total number of local controllers planned in this
geographical area, it is useful to perform the deployment in such
a way that each smart meter can communicate with the maximum
number of nearby controllers to facilitate active local controller
switching under jamming. To address this challenge in the self-
healing smart grid, our framework proposes the optimal placement
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Fig. 13. Communication Overhead under different jammer transmission
powers when applying the retransmission scheme.
of a fixed number of local controllers to maximize the overlapping
coverage of each smart meter.
Assume there are M smart meters and I local controllers
in a specific geographic region. We formulate the smart grid
communication subsystem network in this region into a connected,
undirected graph, which is represented by a neighborhood adja-
cency matrix CI×M between smart meter and local controller as
follows:
CI×M =
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
l1,1 l1,2 · · · l1,M
l2,1 l2,2 · · · l2,M
· · · · · ·
lI,1 lI,2 · · · lI,M
⎤
⎥⎥⎦ ,
where each element of the graph li,j (with i = 1, · · · , I and
j = 1, · · · ,M ) represents a communication link between a local
controller LCi and a smart meter SMj under normal operations.
When a smart meter SMj can communicate with a local controller
LCi, the corresponding element li,j in the matrix CI×M is 1,
otherwise it is 0.
Whether a smart meter SMj is covered or not by a local
controller LCi depends on the signal propagation model and the
distance between them. The received power at the local controller
LCi should exceed the predefined threshold γ0, which guarantees
successful packet delivery. Therefore, the communication link li,j
should satisfy the following condition:
li,j = { 1 PLCi,SMj > γ0;0 otherwise;
PLCi,SMj = PT − PL0 − 10γ1og10(
∥∥∥qLCi − qSMj ∥∥∥
d0
)−Xg,
(25)
where qSMj (with j = 1, · · · ,M,) and qLCi (with i = 1, · · · , I,)
represent the position of a smart meter SMj and local controller
LCi respectively.
13
Our objective is to find the optimal placement of the I local
controllers with positions qLCi , i = 1, · · · , I , in the network such
that each smart meter can be covered by at least k local controllers.
Therefore, the optimization problem of local controller placement
can be formulated as:
arg max
qLCi ,i=1,··· ,I
11×ICI×M1M×1
s.t. 11×ICI×nvj ≥ k
(26)
where 11×I and 1M×1 are I-length column and M -length row
vector with all 1’s elements. vj is a M -length column vector with
only jth element equals to 1 and all other elements are 0. Note
that the positions of smart meters qSMj are known.
Equation 26 searches for the optimal positions of all local
controllers, LCi, until the summation of all the link state li,j
in the neighborhood adjacency matrix CI×M is maximized. To
avoid the optimization process from falling into a local optimal
solution, we enforce that each smart meter should be covered by
at least k local controllers. This optimization problem of searching
for the positions of local controllers can be solved using the
integer programming technique [35]. The optimal placement of
local controllers serves as inputs into our proposed framework to
facilitate intelligent local controller switching under jamming.
9 CONCLUSION
Jamming attacks in the last mile of the smart grid aim to disrupt the
data communication between smart meters and local controllers
and further launch a variety of adversarial activities. In this paper,
we have exploited local controller switching to provide resilience
of data delivery under jamming in the distribution network. The
proposed framework enables smart meters to utilize all the avail-
able channels from nearby local controllers to ensure successful
data delivery. We have further integrated a retransmission scheme
into our proposed LCS-CH framework to enhance the success-
ful data delivery. Theoretical analysis shows that our proposed
intelligent local controller switching with channel hopping (LCS-
CH) framework reduces the jamming probability compared to the
pure channel hopping approach. Additionally, we have provided
theoretical insights into the jamming probability affected by the
jammer’s transmission power and shadowing factor. Furthermore,
our testbed using MicaZ motes shows the feasibility of imple-
menting the intelligent local controller switching scheme in a
ZigBee network. And our large-scale simulation results confirm
the effectiveness of our approach even when multiple jammers
are present. Finally, we have provided guidelines on the optimal
placement of local controllers to ensure effective switching of
smart meters under jamming, leading toward a self-healing com-
munication subsystem in the smart grid. In our future work, we
may design a mechanism for negotiating dynamic channel hopping
sequences.
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